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THE DIFFICULT QUEST FOR A UNIFORM MARITIME LAW:
FAILURE OF THE BRUSSELS CONVENTIONS TO ACHIEVE
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON COLLISION
LIABILITY, LIENS, AND MORTGAGES
WI-HENEVER a vessel engaged in international trade is the subject of a legal
claim or controversy, it is possible that the law of any one of a number of
nations may apply, or even that of several simultaneously.' But if the admiralty
courts of each nation enforce rules and remedies which vary greatly from
those of other maritime states, confusion and unpredictability are sure to
follow. For this reason, commentators have suggested that a uniform law
for the high seas is a logical complement to the technology which has made
international commerce possible.
2
At the end of the nineteenth century, international accord on matters of
maritime law was virtually non-existent.3 Since that time, various efforts
have been made to improve the situation.4 The most sustained and extensive
drive has been that of the Comit6 Maritime International, an organization
comprised of representatives of business and legal interests from the leading
marine nations. 5 The Comit6 had its first meeting in 1897, and continues today
as an active organization. Early in its history, it became apparent that the
most practical way of achieving uniformity was by a series of treaties.0
The Comit6 has drafted nine agreements, known as the Brussels Conventions.
They deal with such problems as salvage, collision liability, limitation of ship-
owners' liability, maritime liens and mortgages, bills of lading, and the arrest
1. For illustrations, see text at notes 14 and 81 infra.
2. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote of the Brussels Collisions Convention:
"The convention is one result of a general movement on the part of commercial
nations of the world to attain a certain measure of uniformity in their laws to aid
and promote the international exchange of goods. I feel that business will be aided
by harmonizing the laws of the several countries so that persons who carry on
trade can know with more certainty their exact legal rights and obligations."
Letter to Senator Key Pittman, dated June 13, 1939, printed in 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 1068.
See also Nielsen, The Lack of Uniformity in the Law and Practice of States with
Regard to Merchant Vessels, 13 Ame. J. INT. L. 1 (1919) ; Franck, A Naw Law for the
Seas, 42 L.Q. Rzv. 25 (1926).
3. Franck, supra note 2.
4. A comprehensive study of efforts to achieve international accord by treaty may be
found in 4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 620 (6th ed. 1940).
5. An account of the inception and early growth of the Comit6 is given in Frauck,
supra note 2.
6. See Franck, supra note 2, at 27.
The propriety of changing established domestic law by means of international treaties
was soon challenged. Id. at 28. This argument was voiced against the Collisionm Con-
vention in the United States. See text at note 33 infra.
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of ships.7 The vision of the Comit6's founders was a "new law of the high
seas," extending to all incidents of international ocean commerce. But this
dream is today in large part unfulfilled. From the beginning, the principle of
uniformity has come into conflict with various private interests which have
felt that the added convenience of international accord and predictability would
not compensate for the economic disadvantages of alteration of national law.
Of the nine conventions, only two have been ratified by the United States.8
And Great Britain, the other leading maritime nation, although more receptive
to the work of the Comit6, has also failed to ratify several key conventions.9
This comment will examine the failure to win American approval of the
Brussels Conventions dealing with collision liability and with maritime liens
and mortgages. It will attempt to further understanding of the actions of the
commercial interests affected and to suggest steps that might profitably be
taken among maritime nations at this time.
COLLISiON LLBILITY
Civil liability following a collision between vessels was one of the initial
subjects dealt with by the Comit6 Maritime International. The Brussels Con-
ventions to create uniformity in the laws of salvage and collision liability were
the first ones drafted, being completed in 1910. The Salvage Convention won
approval in the United States without undue trouble largely because it
enacted existing American principles, 10 but the Collisions Convention has been
the target of bitter opposition. Although the American delegates to the 1909
conference subscribed to the draft, subject to certain reservations,1 ' it has
7. The other conventions involve the immunity of state owned ships, and civil and
penal jurisdiction in collision cases. All nine conventions are discussed in 4 BEzecriLv,
ADMnurR 258-69, 273-77 (6th ed. 1940).
8. These are the Salvage Convention of 1910 and the Ocean Bills of Lading Cun-
vention of 1924 (usually referred to in the United States as the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 49 STAT. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1952)). They are printed in 6 BEN-iLtr,
AnxmRA.LT 200, 154 (6th ed. 1940).
9. Great Britain has not ratified the conventions regarding limitation of liability, and
maritime liens and mortgages.
10. Ratification occurred on January 25, 1913. 37 STAT. 1658 (1913). "This oanve n-
tion, except in a few paragraphs, states the law of salvage as it now exibts in the United
States." AmERIcAx DEIEGATEs TO THE THm INTERNATIONAL CONFERNCE U, ARITIME
LAW, REPORT 14 (1909), recommending ratification.
11. Ibid. The convention is reprinted in full in 6 BENIEDicr, ADMIRALTY 4 (6th ed.
1940). See note 15 infra for its key provisions.
Under instructions from the State Department, the United States delegates signed
the convention subject to four reservations. These provided that: (1) The convention'b
proportional fault rule would not affect the operation of the Harter Act; (2) The
convention would not create a right of action for wrongful death until such provisiuns
were supported by appropriate acts of Congress; (3) The provisions of Article 6 of the
convention would not in any way affect legal presumpti-,ns created by the laws of the
United States; (4) The-provisions of the convention would be applicable only in American
federal courts of admiralty, and not in the state courts. For the subsequent history of
these reservations, see text at notes 51 and 66 infra.
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never been ratified by this country. A favorable report by a Senate subcom-
mittee in 1939 represented the convention's high-water mark. 12 America's
failure to ratify has left its law of collision liability unique among the maritime
nations of the Western world.'
3
In pre-convention days, the legal consequences of a collision between vessels
of diverse flags often varied from one forum to another. A late nineteenth
century collision which gave rise to litigation in three countries well illus-
trates the situation.' 4 Both ships were at fault, in differing degrees. Both
suffered hull damages, and there were cargo losses on each; in addition, a
death claim was brought by the relatives of a Dutch seaman. Suits resulted
in England, Belgium, and Holland; and, although the identical fact situation
was involved, the three countries determined liability in three different ways.
The English court divided the material damages equally between the vessels.
In Belgium, material damages were awarded on a proportional fault basis. And
in the Dutch court, the death claimants were denied all recovery on a strict
common-law theory of contributory negligence.
The Collisions Convention of 1910 put forward one central concept. Where
a collision occurs between sea-going vessels or between sea-going vessels and
vessels of inland navigation, and if two or more vessels are at fault, the liability
of each for property damage shall be in proportion to the degree of fault, without
joint and several liability to third parties.", Thus, if a vessel is one-third at fault,
it will be liable for only one-third of the damage to the other vessel or its cargo,
or to the property of the crews, passengers, or other persons on board either
12. S. REP. Exac. No. 4, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). The report is reprinted in 1939
Am. Afar. Cas. 1051.
13. The United States is the only major maritime nation which has not ratified the
Collisions Convention of 1910. For a list of adhering countries, see 6 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY
4 (6th ed. 1940).
14. The litigation is described by Franck, A New Law for the Seas, 42 L.Q. Rrv. 25
(1926). It was this case which led M. Franck to examine other aspects of international
maritime law, and to become active in the founding of the Comit6 Maritime Interna-
tional, of which he became president.
15. Following are vital provisions of the convention:
"Article 1. Where a collision occurs between seagoing vessels or between sea-
going vessels and vessels of inland navigation the compensation due for damages
caused to the vessels, or to any things or persons on board thereof, shall be settled
in accordance with the following provisions, in whatever waters the collision takes
place.
"Article 2. If the collision is accidental, if it is caused by force majeure, or if
the causes of the collision are in doubt, the damages shall be borne by those who
have suffered them.
"This provision shall be applicable nothwithstanding the fact that the vessels,
or any one of them, may have been at anchor (or otherwise made fast) at the
time of the casualty.
"Article 3. If the collision is caused by the fault of one of the vessels, liability
to make good the damages shall attach to the one which has committed the fault.
"Article 4. If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vesel shall
be in proportion to the degree of the faults respectively committed. Provided that if,
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vessel. No carrier can be held directly liable to its own cargo for damage
caused by negligence, under the universally accepted Brussels Convention on
Ocean Bills of Lading,' 6 which was based on the principles of the American
Harter Act.
1 7
The convention's system of proportional fault excited the opposition of
American cargo interests and has prevented its ratification by the United
States to this day. Where vessels collide and cargo is damaged, American law
holds that cargo is entitled to one hundred per cent recovery if both vessels are
in any degree at fault. Under the provisions of the Harter Act, cargo may
not recover from its own carrier for damages resulting from the negligence
of captain and crew.' 8 But American case law permits a one hundred per cent
recovery from the non-carrier, even where that vessel's fault was only minor.10
having regard to the circumstances, it is not possible to establish the degree uf the
respective faults, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the liability shall be
apportioned equally.
"The damages caused either to the vessels, or to their cargoes, or to the efftets
or other property of the crews, passengers, or other persons on board, shall be borne
by the vessels in fault in the above proportion without joint and several liability
toward third parties.
"In respect of damages caused by death or personal injury, the vessels in fault
shall be jointly as well as severally liable to third parties, without prejudice to the
right of recourse of the vessel which has paid a larger part than that which
in accordance with the first paragraph of this article she ought ultimately to bear.
"It is left to the law of each country to determine, as regards such recourse,
the scope and effect of any legal or contractual provisions which limit the liability
of the owners of a vessel toward persons on board."
For the full 18 articles, see 6 BENEDICr, ADMILLTY 4 (6th ed. 1940).
16. The Convention is reprinted in 6 id. 154.
17. 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-95 (1952). See note IS infra.
18. 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-95 (1952). The Harter Act vas altered
in some respects by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 STAT. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 1300-15 (1952), the American implementation of the Brussels Convention on Ocean
Bills of Lading (the "Hague Rules"), which the United States ratified on April 16, 1936.
The field of marine bills of lading is one where virtual international uniformity has been
achieved. See RoBiNson, AnDmnzaLY 495-503 (1939).
Under both American statutes, the immunity of a shipowner from liability to cargu
for the negligence of his servants is conditioned upon the shipowner exercising due dili-
gence in furnishing a seaworthy vessel. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is more
advantageous to the shipowner, however, since it requires cargo to prove that the failure
to exercise due diligence was in some wmay a proximate or contributing cause of the
loss. Under the Harter Act, cargo need only prove a lack of due diligence in furnishing
a ship seaworthy in all respects, regardless of causal connection. Note, 27 V,%. L RLv. 1079
(1941); 3 BExEDIcT, AD-mzALTr § 95 (6th ed. 1940). See alsu The Isis, 290 U.S. 333
(1933).
19. This principle was established in The Alabama and The Gamecck, 92 U.S. 695
(1875); and The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876). In permitting full rmcovery against wI
vessel where two were to blame, the Supreme Court refused tu fullow the English
case law on cargo's remedies. Prior to ratification of the Collisions Convention,
England limited cargo to a 50% recovery against the non-carrier, even though the bill
of lading invariably prevented cargo from recovering anything frum the carrying
ship. The Milan, 1 Lush. 388, 167 Eng. Rep. 167 (1861). The English court in The Milan
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Against this background, the disadvantages to cargo of the convention rule of
proportional fault become clear. The Harter Act would continue to bar an
action by cargo against its own vessel; and the non-carrier could be recovered
from only to the extent of its proportional blame. Assuming a both-to-blame
collision, cargo would always stand to lose something.
20
American shipowners, on the other hand, greeted the convention principles
with enthusiasm. Their immunity under the Harter Act from liability to their
own cargo had become, in the event of a both-to-blame collision, jeopardized.
Under the famous decision of the Supreme Court in The Chataltoochie,1
after the non-carrying vessel has been assessed for one hundred per cent re-
covery by the other ship's cargo, it may then require a contribution of half this
amount from the carrying vessel. 22 The anomalous result of The Chattahoochde
was to make a carrier indirectly liable to its cargo for half the damage when
only partially at fault, although totally absolved when entirely at fault. 2 3 Ship-
owners sought to escape the effects of The Chattahoochie by writing into bills
believed that where cargo on vessel A sues vessel B for damages arising out of a both-to-
blame collision, vessel B should not be required to pay more than half the cargo's damages.
To hold vessel B liable in full when it was only partially at fault, it reasoned, would be
unjust. The United States Supreme Court, in The Atlas, had no such difficulty in de-
creeing a 100% recovery for cargo against vessel B. It stressed that cargo was entirely
innocent, and deserved full recompense, even though this caused certain hardships to
vessel B.
The English recovery rule of The Milan has, of course, been altered by the provisions
of the Maritime Conventions Act of 1911, by which England put into effect the Brussels
Collisions Convention. Marsden, CoLLISIONS AT SEA 158 (10th ed. 1953).
20. For full discussion of the economic consequences of the Collisions Convention if
ratified by the United States, see Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at
Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1926).
21. 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
22. For a good discussion of the case, see RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY 867-70 (1939).
American law decrees an equal division of all damages between the two vessels when
both ships are at fault, even where the degrees of fault differ. RoBINsoN, ADMIRALTY
853 (1939). Thus, where vessel A is damaged to the extent of $10,000, vessel B, $10,000,
and A's cargo, $10,000, B is entitled to add cargo's recovery from her to her own damages.
This gives a total of $30,000, and renders A liable for a total of $15,000. A will bear her
own loss of $10,000, and pay B $5,000, which sum is, in effect, half of the loss suffered
by A's own cargo.
Ratification of the Collisions Convention would, of course, alter the American rule
of equal division of damages to one of proportional liability. See note 15 supra and
accompanying text.
23. The Chattahoochie certainly seems to negative the effect of the Harter Act in it
both-to-blame collision. See RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY 864 (1939). But differing opinions
have been expressed as to whether Chattahoochie's result is genuinely anomalous. It has
been argued that the Harter Act was intended to affect only the relations between the
carrier and its cargo, and therefore has no application when the non-carrier settles
with the carrier. See Green, The Harter Act, 16 HARV. L. RF:v. 157 (1903).
On the other hand, M. Franck, of the Comit6, declared: "Here is the point. Both
ships are to blame. My cargo is in ship A. I cannot recover from ship A under
the negligence clause, but I am paid full damages by ship B, and ship B collects from
ship A her share in my damage. Do you call that law? If you say the Harter Act is
[Vol. 64: 878
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of lading the "both-to-blame" clause, whereby cargo uwas required to indemnify
the carrier for its cargo damage contribution to the non-carrier.24 But the
legality of the both-to-blame clause came under early attack by cargo interests,
who were confident that the Supreme Court would invalidate it.Y If the con-
vention were ratified, the carrier's freedom from indirect liability to its cargo
in a both-to-blame collision would be assured as a matter of national policy
without risking the hazards of litigation. -0
wrong, if you say the universal convention of 1923 is wrong, all right, get it suppres.Fed.
But if it is not suppressed, you can't consider that an interpretation of law is !ound which
permits you to get around the agreed principle. You may defend it, if you like, all you
like-but it is not justice." Address by Louis Franck, U.S. Maritime Law Ass'n meeting.
reprinted in U.S. MAamRsmE LAw Ass'-x, PRocsrINas (Doc. No. 139, 1927).
In its most recent pertinent opinion, the Supreme Court did not consider the resulL of
Chattahoochie as intolerably anomalous. "It is said to be 'anomalous' to hold a carrier
not liable at all if it alone is guilty of negligent navigation but at the same time to hold it
indirectly liable for one-half the cargo damages if another ship is jointly negligent with
it. Assuming for the moment that all rules of law must be symmetrical, we think it
would be 'anomalous' to hold that a cargo owner, who has an unquestioned right under
the law to recover full damages from a noncarrying vessel, can be compelled to give up
a portion of that recovery because of a stipulation e.xacted in a bill of lading." United
States v. Atlantic Mlut. Ins. Co. (The Esso Belgium), 343 U.S. 236, 23S (1952). This
was the decision which invalidated the "both-to-blame" clause in bills of lading. See tet
at note 74 infra.
24. A typical both-to-blame clause is printed in RoDiNsox, ADnInL'rY 472 n21i
(1939), and reads as follows:
If the ship comes into collision with another ship as a result of the negligence of
the other ship and any act, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the
servants of the Carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship, the
owners of the goods carried hereunder will indemnify the Carrier against all k',s or
liability to the other or non-carrying ship or her owners insofar as such loss or
liability represents loss of, or damage to, or any claim whatsoever of the owners
of said goods, paid or payable by the other or non-carrying ship or her o%%ners
to the owners of said goods and set off, recouped or recovered by the other ur nul-
carrying ship or her owners as part of their claim against the carrying ship or Carrir.
See also KNAuTH, OcEA,,c Bu S oF LADING 101 (4th ed. 1953). The effect of the
clause w)as to limit cargo to 50% recovery where both vessels were to blame.
25. Before a Senate subcommittee conducting hearings on the Collisions Conventiun,
D. Roger Englar, the principal spokesman for American cargo interests, stated that lie
had counseled cargo underwriters against increasing premiums when the b.th-to-bane
clause was included in the bill of lading. His position was that the clause %as invalid,
and that charging an extra premium in response to it would imply that the clause had
been accepted. See Hearings Before Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations on Rules
to Govern the Liability of Vessels When Collisions Occur Between Them, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 374 (1938) (hereinafter referred to as Hearings).
At the time of the hearings, a district court had held the bjti-tu-blan-t claue valid.
The San Vicente, 14 F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). But cargo's posit!'n v:ab ultinatJl),
justified when the Supreme Court invalidated the clause in Unitcd States v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co. (The Esso Belgium), 343 U.S. 236 (1952). See text at nAte 74 iafra.
26. The advantages of the convention in this respect were stated by Charleb S.
Haight, chief advocate of ratification:
"Now, if the convention gives the same results as the clanse, but the claue has gut
to be litigated, clear through the Supreme Court, why do you nut take the solution
1955]
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Controversy came to a head when in 1937, twenty-seven years after the
American delegates had signed the original draft, the executive branch of the
government recommended the convention to the Senate.27 Five days of ener-
getic debate took place before Senator Schwellenbach's Subcommittee on
Foreign Relations.
28
Spokesmen for American cargo interests first advanced the protest, familiar
in present times, that the convention was "un-American." It was suggested
that the convention was the product of foreign, primarily shipowning nations,
and that the American delegates had merely been invited to accept or reject
an accomplished fact, with scant heed paid to their views.2 9 Impetus for the
Convention, the argument ran, came from European shipowners whose real
concern was economic gain and not uniformity of law; therefore, domestic
interests should not be sacrificed to further this end.30
More persuasive was cargo's contention that a fundamental change in its
right to recovery should be effected, if at all, as part of an overall congressional
which avoids all this litigation by ratifying the convention, the solution which will
accomplish the same results as litigation?"
Hearifigs, p. 272.
27. A number of causes combined to delay executive action on the convention. The
controversy stirred by cargo underwriters postponed any definite American action until
the conclusion of World War I. In 1922 the then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert
Hoover, advised that the Collisions Convention be held in abeyance until other Brussels
Conventions then under discussion were also ready for submission. The result was to
bury the Collisions Convention for another fifteen years. Finally, in 1937, the convention
was sent to the Senate with the approval of the President, the State Department, and
the Secretary of Commerce. These historical details are taken from the testimony of
Francis B. Sayre, Assistant Secretary of State, before the Senate subcommittee. See
Hearings, p. 35-36.
28. The report of the subcommittee was signed by Senators Schwellenbach, Pepper,
and White. However, except for a brief appearance by Senator Pepper, the arguments
were conducted before Senator Schwellenbach alone.
29. This suggestion was made to Charles C. Burlingham, one of the United States
subscribers to the convention in 1910. Mr. Burlingham refuted the suggestion, and
Senator Schwellenbach pointed out that the draft the United States delegation signed
in Brussels in 1910 had been fully studied for a year in this country by the State
Department. See Hearings, pp. 76, 77.
30. Mr. Englar stated in his testimony:
"I think we should clearly have in mind this: that every dollar you take away
from the American shipping public by this shift goes as to more than half of it
to foreigners .... Anyone who will take the trouble to follow the various interna-
tional conferences will have no delusions at all as to the motivating force behind
the delegates from the different countries. It may be pure coincidence, but you
will find that their views always coincide with the general interest of the country
that they represent economically."
Hearings, p. 375.
In a statement included in the record, the National Industrial Traffic League, a
national organization of shippers and receivers of commodities, p-sed this rhetorical
question :
"Even if such a movement as this were started by American-ship owners (which
it was not), it might be considered seriously, but not favorably, by American ex-
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revision of American maritime law. Cargo viewed full recovery as "a very
ancient, universal right."31 Its representatives argued that although Chatta-
hoochie may have led to anomalous results, this right of cargo was in no way
dependent upon that case; nor had the Harter Act affected that right.3-
Ratification of the convention principles, they maintained, would thus deprive
cargo of a long-vested interest. Therefore, the only fair way of altering the
maritime law was by means of domestic legislation taking into account more
than one particular problem.as This insistence by cargo upon change by the
whole Congress rather than by the Senate alone, however reasonable in itself,
had also decided tactical advantages. The principal spokesman on behalf of the
Collisions Convention had admitted that it would be far more difficult to
obtain approval of the Brussels principles in the form of a House bill than to
secure Senate ratification of the treaty.34 This admission was seized upon as
porters and importers; who would give up substantial rights which they nr ,w have,
and why do this to please a group of foreign underwriters?"
Hearings, p. 455.
On the other hand, a memorandumn prepared by the Unitd States Maritime Com-
mission commented:
"Considering the matter as a whole, it would arpLar that the 'foreign influence'
argument is not entitled to much weight. The division of interest rather is betv.cen
P. & I. underwriters (foreign and American) as opposed to cargo undevrwriters
(foreign and American)."
Hearings p. 44.
31. Hearings, p. 123.
32. The right of 100% recovery was viewed as the right tu rcco er in full againt
one of two joint tort feasors. Hearings, p. 123.
While cargo's spokesman insisted that the Harter Act should have nu effect upon
cargo's right to be made whole, he was willing to concede that the Act could he conbtrued
as putting an end to the non-carrier's right of contribution from the carrying vessel for
cargo liability.
"Mr. Englar: Now, it might be very logical, in view of the Harter Act, for the
Supreme Court to say that the non-carrying vessel did not have any right of
contribution but I do not see that it would have been at all logical to ay that
cargo could not recover against the perfect stranger."
Hearings, p. 125. This would have required the non-carrier to pay cargo in full, no matter
what her degree of fault.
33. Hearings, pp. 369, 387-88.
Ira A. Campbell, who represented certain American shipowners, joined cargo in
arguing that domestic legislation should precede ratification of the convention, b "cause
of the differences the treaty would bring about in American law. Hearings, p. 192. How-
ever, he emphasized that the "primary purpose" of the convention-immunity of the
carrier from liability to its cargo-had already been achieved by the insertion of the
both-to-blame clause in bills of lading. Hearings, p. 177. Since that time, lwv'ever, the
both-to-blame clause has been held invalid by the Supreme Court. United States V.
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. (The Esso Belgium), 343 U.S. 236 (1951). See te't at note
74 infra.
34. "Mr. Haight: I know that the argument will be made that we sliuld drop this
convention and go ahead and pass a law. Mr. Englar, I am sure, will want that
course followed. He is opposed to the rules in the cunventiun and it is qftihe olk'ous
that he will have a much better chance of defcating the present effort to got uri-
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evidence of something like bad faith on the part of the convention's advocates, "
and undoubtedly influenced cargo's enthusiasm for domestic legislation as the
proper procedure.
In assailing the alteration of "a basic right" through ratification of a treaty
which would leave other aspects of the maritime law unchanged, cargo's
notion was that of a quid pro quo. If it was to lose something, it should get
something in return. Casting about for a suitable quid, cargo's counsel sug-
gested a possible economic gain for his interests through alteration of the
law on limitation of a shipowner's liability.36
All maritime nations follow some scheme of limitation of the shipowner's
liability.37 In the United States, property claims against a vessel are limited
to the value of the ship after the disaster.3 8 If the vessel is totally lost, the
owner is liable only to the extent of his interest in the "freight then pending":
passenger fares as well as cargo income.8 0 English law decrees a fund of I8
per ton for property damage, but limits liability to that amount.40 The Brussels
Convention on limitation of liability, which neither the United States nor
Great Britain has ratified, adopts a compromise between the British system of
fund forfeiture and the American system of abandonment and surrender of
the ship's value.4 1 For property damage, recovery cannot exceed the £8 per
ton fund figure; but if the value of the vessel after the disaster is less than
£8 per ton, the owner is liable only in that lesser amount. It is provided,
however, that the "freight then pending" is always deemed to be ten per cent
of the value of the vessel at the start of the voyage so that property damage
claimants will have a substantial minimum fund upon which to rely.
42
Cargo declared during the hearings that if it was time to decrease its
recovery in both-to-blame collisions, perhaps it was also time to establish a
fund out of which cargo claims could be satisfied even if the vessel was a total
loss. Cargo interests, it was suggested, might look with more favor on the
form ity if he can oppose the bill in the House of Representatives, before the con-
vention is ratified, than he will after the convention has been ratified. After we have
ratified the convention everybody will say that this is the right rule and, of course,
we will extend it to everybody and be through with it."
Hearings, p. 117 (emphasis added).
35. Hearings, p. 376.
36. Hearings, p. 369.
37. Roaszsoz, ADMIRALTY 877 (1939).
38. 16 STAT. 458 (1871), 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1952). For a review of the development
of limitation legislation in the United States, see RoBINsoN, ADMIRALTY 879-80 (1939).
The shipowner's right to limit his liability is not absolute; rather, it is conditioned
upon the loss being occasioned without his "privity or knowledge." For a discussion of
this requirement, see id. at 941-50.
39. Id. at 930-34. A different limitation is provided for losses arising out of death
or personal injury. Such claimants are guaranteed recovery from a fund equal to $60 per
ton by the 1935 and 1936 amendments to the act. Id. at 938.
40. 3 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 638 (6th ed. 1940).
41. The full text of the convention is printed in 6 id. 87; and 1923 Am. Mar. Cas, tA9.
42. 4 BENEDicT, ADMIRALTY 274 (6th ed. 1940).
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Collisions Convention if a sixty dollar per ton fund, presently available under
American law only for death and injury claims, 43 were also made accessible to
cargo claims.4 4 This would enhance cargo's recovery in cases of total loss, and
would compensate it in some measure for the economic disadvantages of the
Collisions Convention.
Interjection of the limitations problem into the controversy over collision
liabilities indicates the extent to which the unique features of admiralty law
are interrelated. It is difficult to alter one without becoming seriously involved
in problems as to others.CY For this very reason, it was the original goal uf
the Comit6 to provide for all aspects of the martime law by a series of Brussels
Conventions.46 Because the United States, in addition to Great Britain, had
failed to ratify the convention on limitation of liability, cargo was able to argue
that ratification of the Collisions Convention would not produce complete uni-
formity in the matter of collision liability. Even though agreement as to
liability would result, differences as to the limitation of that liability would
remain.47
The opponents of the Collisions Convention foresaw other undesirable results
stemming from ratification. They predicted that efforts to apportion fault would
be difficult to administer and would add to litigation, 4 and that insurance rates
43. See note 39 supra.
44. 'Mr. Englar's suggested statutory amendment was as follows:
"In the case of any seagoing vessel the amount of the owner's liability as limited
under subsection (a) shall in no event be less than %bO.CO per ton of such vessel's
tonnage to be available in the first instance for the payment of hsses in reslpect of
loss of life or bodily injury and, after payment of such losses in full, for the pay
ment of any other losses for which the owner may be liable."
He prefaced the reading of the suggested amendment into the rectord with the~e woids:
"I am not sure that if he ['Mr. Haight] will consent to this, I won't consent t. ohis
confounded convention, bad as it is. But I want to put this in to show that I am
not just down here because maybe somebody is taking a dollar a%\ay from me. We
will be fair. I am not so sure but that Mr. Campbell and I can get wgther and
work something out. But I will say this: He will have to give us something, I
am ready to give up, but he has got to give something up too."
Hearings, pp. 368, 369.
45. American shipowners have recognized this as clearly as have cargo interests.
They have been wary of seeking to introduce the Collisions Convention principles into
domestic law, fearing that cargo would retaliate by attacking the limitation of liability
statutes. See Hearings, p. 157.
46. See Franck, A New Law for the Seas, 42 L.Q. REv. 25 (1926).
47. For example, where vessel A is one-third at fault, vessel B is two-thirds at fault,
and cargo on A is damaged, ratification of the Collisions Convention would mean that in all
countries cargo could 3Fecover no more than two-thirds of its damages against vessel b.
But if vessel B is a total loss, the recuveries possible under American and English law
would still differ. In America, cargo would recover no more thaa any pirding freight.
See text at notes 38-39 supra. In England, cargo would have the benefit of an £3 per ton
fund. See text at note 40 supra.
Cargo made this point at the hearings in order to show that tlu unifornty stressed
by the convention's advocates as its chief merit was in part illusory. Hcarings, p. 152.
48. Hearings, pp. 182, 240.
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on cargo shipments would rise.49 Furthermore, much concern was voiced over
article six of the convention, which provides: "There shall be no legal presump-
tion of fault in regard to liability for collision." When the United States signed
the convention in 1910, it reserved the right not to be bound by this provision. 0
But by the time the draft reached the Senate subcommittee, this reservation
had been dropped.51 Article six, its critics claimed, would destroy a number
of presumptions established by American case law, with resulting confusion in
our admiralty practice.
5 2
Not unnaturally, the proponents of the Collisions Convention preferred to
stress the need for international uniformity rather than ratification's economic
advantages to shipowners. They emphasized that the United States was the
only major maritime power that did not abide by the convention rules. There-
fore, it was high time to ratify a convention which this country had signed
in 1910 in order to put an end to uncertainty and forum-shopping.5U It was
urged that only by ratification of the convention could genuine uniformity
be achieved; subsequent domestic legislation would be a desirable supplement,
extending the convention's principles to collisions involving exclusively Ameri-
can vessels and cargoes.
5 4
Furthermore, the convention's advocates claimed that ratification, rather
than tampering with "ancient rights," would instead give full effect to the
policy underlying the Harter Act.5 They agreed that cargo's right to re-
49. Hearings, p. 372.
50. See note 11 supra.
51. The executive branch of the Government felt that the "apparent unimportance" of
American statutory and judicial presumptions warranted dropping the reservation.
Hearings, p. 35.
52. The most discussed of these presumptions was the rule of The Pennsylvania, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874). The Supreme Court held that in a suit arising out of a
collision, if the plaintiff proves the defendant violated a safety statute which might
be causally connected with the collision, the court will presume that such violation wa
a cause of the collision unless the defendant proves, not only that it was not but that it
could not have been a cause.
The assumption during the hearings was that the Collisions Convention would, indeed,
do away with such judicial presumptions. Government sponsors of the convention believed
they were not particularly important. See note 51 supra. Opponents of ratification felt
abolition of judicial presumptions would upset accepted practice, and cause officers and
crewmen to become careless in ship handling. Hearings, p. 178.
However, Benedict takes the position that Article 6 of the convention applies only
to statutory presumptions, and not to those created independently by case law and that
the French text of the convention was inaccurately translated. In the field of collision
law, the only statutory presumption is that of the Stand-By Act, 26 STT. 425 (1890),
33 U.S.C. § 367 (1952). It provides that a shipmaster who fails to stand by after a
collision is presumed at fault. See 4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 263-67 (6th ed. 1940).
53. Hearings, pp. 37, 115-16. These pages contain representative remarks.
54. Domestic legislation was deemed necessary in order to extend the rules of the
convention "to every case where all of the inteTests are American, and where, as an
obvious matter of propriety, the convention does not cover it." Hearings, pp. 11, 117, 120.
55. Hearings, pp. 113-14.
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covery did not stem from Chattahoochie;r3 but they, argued that the Harter
Act was intended to undermine that right by immunizing a carrier from lia-
bility to its own cargo. Therefore, if cargo could not recover from its carrier
in a collision where the carrier was solely at fault, a fortiori it should not
recover where the carrier is only partially so.57 And the convention rnles
only practice simple justice in restricting recovery against the non-carnier to
its share of the blame.
As for the practical difficulties which cargo alleged were inherent in the
Collisions Convention, its proponents pointed to its smooth functioning in the
ratifying nations, notably England, over the previous twenty-five years.-"
Insurance rates had not gone up;59 nor had the proportional fault system
proved unmanageable. With respect to the latter point, a questionnaire was
placed into the record demonstrating that 26 of 28 federal district court judges
polled were in favor of altering the American rule of splitting the damages in
both-to-blame collision cases to one of proportional fault ;CO moreover, it was
argued that American admiralty lawyers assessed proportional fault all the
time in arriving at settlements out of court.0 '
Considering the desirability of uniformity to be decisive, Senator Schwellen-
bach's subcommittee recommended American adherence to the Collisions Con-
vention. 2 Cargo's objection-that, even if any changes were necessary, domestic
legislation should be adopted in lieu of adherence to the convention-was
dealt with in short order. The committee believed that adoption of the con-
vention was the more orderly and customary procedure. "It is a procedural
56. See text at note 32 supra. Cargo's right to 100% recovery from the non-carritr
stems from Supreme Court decisions in The Alabama and The Gamecock, and The Atlas,
which disapproved the English rule of The Milan. See note 19 supra. These decisions
preceded Chattahoochie by twenty-four years, and form the real basis for cargo's "very
ancient, universal right." See text at note 31 supra.
57. The contrasting ways of viewing the effect of the convention on American law,
are well illustrated by this exchange:
"Mr. Haight: Well, now, isn't it a matter of fact that vhen it is the iolicy of
this country, as of all others, that a shipowner shall pay nothing when the ship is
solely at fault for a collision, doesn't it seem to you anomalous that the owner
must pay half of the damage to his owvn cargo when his ship is half at fault?
"Mr. Eniglar: It seems to me that a more accurate wvay to state the effect of
this convention would be to say that a right which the cargo has against a third
party is to be taken away from it because its own ship is guilty of a fault. That
doesn't seem to me to have any logic at all."
Hearings, p. 407.
58. Mr. Sayre, Assistant Secretary of State, commented that "thirty-one countries
have now put it into successful operation." Hearings, p. 33. Mr. Englar, opposing the
convention, suggested that since the bulk of collision litigation was conducted in England
or the United States, this figure was not as impressive as it seemed. Hcarings, p. 58.
59. Hearings, pp. 89-90. And the faritime Commission felt there %vas no chance
that ratification would cause American rates to go up. Hearings, p. 41.
60. The questionnaire, and the answers thereto, may be found in Hearings, pp. S4-,.
61. Hearings, p. 234.
62. S. REP. Exc. No. 4, 76th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1939). The report is also printed in
1939 Am. M1ar. Cas. 1051.
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question rather than one of substance," the report read, "and indeed demon-
strates the degree of unanimity with which the principles of the convention
are accepted. '6 3 This particular observation must have come as a surprise to
the cargo interests. The Chattahoochie decision was condemned by the report,
and no objection was seen to changing its result by treaty.0 4 As for the in-
surance question, the committee found that cargo-insurance rates are governed
largely by competition in a world insurance market, and that the rate is
the same on cargo moving in vessels subject to the convention as on cargo
moving in the vessels of nations which have failed to adopt the convention.",
The only qualifications to subcommittee support were provisions that the
reservation as to presumptions be reinstated, and that the convention should
not become effective in this country until one year after ratification. 0
The report was sent to the full Foreign Relations Committee, together with
a letter from Secretary of State Hull supporting the convention in the strong-
est terms on behalf of the Departments of State and Commerce, and the Mari-
time Commission.0 7 But the impending world crisis placed the Collisions
Convention on congressional shelves once again, this time perhaps forever.
The Foreign Relations Committee never took action, and on April 8, 1947,
the Brussels Convention on Collision Liability was withdrawn from considera-
tion by President Truman, in the company of a number of other treaties which,
in his opinion, had become obsolete.68 No efforts have been made since then
to resubmit it. An inter-departmental government committee was formed
in 1953 to consider the seven unratified Brussels Conventions, but no proposals
were forthcoming.
The failure of the United States to adhere to the law of collision liability
followed by the rest of the world has had continuing consequences. This dis-
parity in the collision laws, combined with varying limitation rules, has en-
couraged interested parties to try to resort to the courts of the nation offering
63. 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 1055.
64. Id. at 1052. The subcommittee accepted the contention that the decision of The
Chattahoochie frustrated the intent of the Harter Act. Because of the decision, the
Senators noted that "in one important respect the policy underlying the Harter Act has
wever, in fact, become effective in the courts of the United States." Id. at 1055 (empha-
sis added). See note 23 supra.
65. 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 1057.
66. Of the four original reservations to the convention, see note 11 supra, the Presi-
dent had recommended to the Senate the retention of the first (proportional fault shall
not affect the Harter Act) and the fourth (the convention would be inapplicable in
state courts). The President's letter is printed in 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 1058.
The subcommittee report eliminated the fourth reservation entirely; amended the first
by providing that it also applied to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act; and advised that
the third reservation dealing with presumptions be retained. Id. at 1056, 1057.
The subcommittee anticipated that domestic legislation would be passed in conformity
with the convention, once the latter had been ratified. See text at note 56 supra. The
one-year delay between ratification and operation of the convention was to ensure all
interested parties a voice in such legislation. Id. at 1055
67. The letter is printed in 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 1068.
68. 16 DEP'T STATE BULL 726 (1947).
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them the best bargain.69 For example, where the non-carrying vessel retains
a substantial value after the collision, cargo generally prefers to bring suit
in an American court and thus take advantage of the one hundred per cent
recovery provided by case law.70 On the other hand, where the ship is a total
loss, cargo will profit by suing in England and benefiting from the £8 per ton
fund.7' Similarly, a shipowner whose vessel is a total loss will always attempt
to localize litigation in an American court. 72 However, where the value of
the vessel is not seriously impaired, the shipowner's preference of a forum
is influenced by the degree to which his ship was at fault, and the possibility
of indirect liability to his own cargo, as well as differing limitation statutes.7a
69. For example, one authority has written of the collision situation:
"This striking difference between the law of the United States and the
law of the other shipping nations has sometimes led shipuwners to adopt
extraordinary precautions to avoid being sued in the Unitd States, and has alv.
given rise to some remarkable efforts by cargo to maintain suits in the United
States in order to gain advantage of the American rule."
KNAuTH, OcEa-'N BILLS OF LADING 211 (4th ed. 1953).
The parties cannot always succeed in localizing litigation in the must favorable
forum. A shipowner, for reasons discussed in note 73 infra, may prefer to defend against
all claims in an English court. He can petition to limit his liability in England, a prtj-
cedure which results in a court order staying and consolidating all actions in respect of
the collision. _MARsDEN, CoLuisoNs AT SnA 320 (10th ed. 1953). The American limitation
procedure has a similar effect. ROBINsox, ADMIRALTY S0 (1939). But a court stay cf
proceedings can have no international effect. Thus, even though a shipowner has petitioned
to limit his liability in England, a claimant can still bring suit again-,t him in the United
States.
Because the jurisdiction of an American admiralty court is discretionary %%hen a
foreign party is involved, RoBINSON, AnmInRALTY 14-20 (1939), a shiptvner way argue
that the court should decline to hear the case out of deference tto a limitation proceeding
commenced in another nation. But this theory was rejected in a recent Second Circuit
opinion. The Western Farmer, 210 F2d 754 (1954). There, a Norwegian vessel,
following a collision with an American vessel carrying German-owned cargo, linited
liability in England. When the cargo brought suit in America, the Norwegian shipowner
persuaded the district judge to deny jurisdiction. The Second Circuit unanimously re-
versed. It is unlikely that an English court would give any greater effect to an American
limitation order.
70. See text at note 19 supra.
71. Where the non-carrier is a total loss, cargo's right to 1001," recovery is an empty
one in America, for the owner's liability is limited to the freight pending. See text
at notes 38-39 supra. An English court will limit cargo's recovery to the proportion of
the non-carrier's fault, but at least there will be a fund out of which some satisfaction
will be available. See text at notes 15 and 40 supra.
72. No matter how great the proportion of his fault, his liability is limited to the
pending freight. See text at notes 38-39 supra.
73. A hypothetical will illustrate the situation. Assume that vessel B, in collision
with vessel A, was four-fifths to blame. Cargo on A was damaged by $1,060,00. Vessel
B's value after the disaster is $1,000,000; however, the British LS per ton limitatiQn
system would reduce total liability to $640,000.
Under British law, the convention would render B liable fur fuur-fifths of the
damage to A's cargo: $S00,000. This would be reduced by the limitatiun law to $A0,Woh.
But an American forum is still more desirable; for by American law B would in the
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Such factors as these compound uncertainty and render amicable settlements
between the parties all the more difficult.
When in 1952 the Supreme Court finally invalidated the both-to-blame
clause in Esso Belgium,"4 it frustrated the efforts of carriers to escape some
of the consequences of American failure to adhere to the Collisions Convention.
Shipowners are now prevented from avoiding indirect liability to their cargo.15
In Esso Belgium, cargo argued that American public policy had decreed a
one hundred per cent recovery for cargo long before the Hatter Act, and that
the rule of equal division of damages was similarly established. Nothing in the
Harter Act had changed these policies. The sole object of the Harter Act, it
was insisted, was to modify the direct liability previously existing between the
carrier and its cargo. The Supreme Court agreed and, because of "the
general rule of law that common carriers cannot stipulate for immunity from
their own or their agents' negligence," 1 6 held the clause invalid as against
public policy. In the view of the three dissenters, congressional desire to exempt
carriers from liability for faulty navigation was in no wise inconsistent with
the both-to-blame clause, which had a precisely similar effect. 77
Esso Belgium, in requiring one hundred per cent recovery by cargo and
the indirect liability of the carrying vessel, has prevented American law from
approaching harmony with that of the rest of the martime world. The decision
was greeted with dismay by ship owners and ship underwriters on both
sides of the Atlantic, who foresaw, in addition to heavier liabilities, renewed
confusion and maneuvering for the most favorable jurisdiction. There the
situation rests today. It is evident that any progress must now be made by
end pay only half of the damage to A's cargo: $500,000. This is so because of The
Chattahoochie's rule of 50% contribution from the carrier.
However, B's preference is quite different if we assume that there was cargo on ,
which was damaged by $500,000. B's liability in England would still be $640,000. But
in America, in addition to the $500,000 owing to A's cargo, under The Challahoochie, B
would also be indirectly liable for half the damage to its own cargo: $250,000. This
would give a total liability of $750,000; and the value of B being $1,000,000, the American
limitation statute affords B's owner no comfort.
Were B only one-fifth instead of four-fifths at fault, B would prefer to litigate in
England whether her own cargo suffered damage or not. In either case, the recovery
against her would be limited to $200,000, her share of the blame in the damage to A's
cargo.
74. United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. (The Esso Belgium), 343 U.S. 236
(1952).
75. See text at notes 23-24 supra.
76. United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. (The Esso Belgium), 343 U.S. 236,
239 (1952).
77. The majority decision has been criticized. "The Court's opinion expresses the
judicial view of public policy on the point, in terms of the views prior to 1893; and-as
the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out--declines to recognize that the Acts of
Congress of 1893 and 1936 justify the abandonment of the ancient view (100% recovery
by 'innocent cargo'), which is thus revivified for the present (lay." KNAUTII, OCeAN
BILLS OF LADING 210 (4th ed. 1953). See also Notes, 52 COLUm. L. R. 1056 (1952),
51 Mic. L. REv. 430 (1952).
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ratification of the Collisions Convention or by domestic legislation, rather than
by private contract.
MA=ITIE LIENS AND MORTGAGES
The problem of maritime liens and mortgages, of great commercial import-
ance, is complicated by a high degree of international uncertainty. Rights in a
vessel, whether arising out of contract claims, tort claims, or security interests,
may be determined in any port at which the vessel calls. 78 Chance may be
the deciding factor, for with the laws of nations widely differing on the creation
and enforcement of maritime liens, a lienor may have his claim substantially
satisfied or entirely shut out, depending upon the jurisdiction in which the
vessel is seized and sold. As Professor Robinson assessed the situation:
"Nothing short of an international convention will suffice to iron out the
variables which are bound to arise in respect to so ambulatory a thing as
a ship."79
The International Convention of 1926 for the Unification of Law Relating
to Maritime Liens and Mortgages represented twenty years of work by the
Comit6.80 The convention aimed at a standard list of liens and priorities
among nations, to the end that interests in vessels might be predictable and
the ship mortgage an effective form of security. But the Liens and Mortgages
Convention has enjoyed less success than the Collisions Convention, since
neither Great Britain nor the United States has adhered to it.
Wide discrepancies existed in the lien laws of various nations when the
Comit6 began its deliberations,8 ' and, due to Anglo-American reluctance, they
persist in large measure today. As in the case of collision liability, interna-
tional conflicts of laws cause great trouble here. The problem is given crucial
significance by the fact that a decree of sale in any admiralty court acting in
rem receives international recognition and divests the vessel of all liens, no
matter who holds them, giving the purchaser title good against the world.82
This makes the law of the forum of the utmost importance to lienors; for
upon that law depend both the existence and the priority of their liens.8 As
to both these factors, the English courts apply the doctrine of lex fori. A
maritime lien may not be enforced at all in an English court if the local law
does not provide a lien for the claim involved; and the priority of maritime
liens in a foreclosure sale is strictly a matter of local procedure.8 4 The Ameri-
can cases embrace a different standard. When a vessel is seized and sold in
78. See text at note 82 infra.
79. RoamsoxN, AD.IRALTY 435 n.226 (1939).
80. The convention is printed in 6 BENEDicr, ADMURALTY 78 (6th ed. 1940).
81. See Franck, A New Law for the Seas, 42 L.Q. Rv. 25, 303 (1926).
82. For a famous American discussion which also reviews foreign authorities, see
The Trenton, 4 Fed. 657 (E.D. Mich. 1880). See also The City of Athens, 83 F. Supp.
67 (D. Md. 1949); RoBInsoN, AD-mILTY 414 (1939).
83. PmicE, MARITIME LrENS 206 (1940); Lord & Glenn, The Foreign Ship M1fort-
gage, 56 YALE L.J. 923, 926-27 (1947).
84. PRicE, op. cit. supra note 83, at 207.
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an American court of admiralty, the existence of a lien is determined by the
lex rei sitae: the law of the place where the facts giving rise to the alleged lien
occurred.8 5 In the case of liens arising out of an incident on the high seas,
American courts apply "the general maritime law as understood in the United
States."8 " American law on the proper priority of liens, when foreign lienors
are involved, is unsettled. Our courts have not availed themselves of the
English solution and treated the matter as purely procedural. Instead, some
cases indicate that a lien's priority is a substantive matter and that the foreign
law should be followed.87 France and Italy have adopted the convention rules
regarding liens and mortgages.8 8 When a convention country's ship is seized
and sold in either of these nations there is no conflicts problem regarding the
enforcement or priority of liens. But if a vessel flying a non-convention flag
is involved, the usual difficulties result. France then applies the lex fori to
both existence and priorities.8 9 Italy, on the other hand, holds that the law of
the flag deterniines the presence of a maritime lien; but priorities fall under
the dominion of the law of the forum.90
The Comit6 envisioned an international agreement which would accomplish
two purposes: (1) unification of the maritime law of liens and mortgages,
thus doing away with the confusion and inconvenience stemming from the
conflicts of laws; and (2) improvement of the status of the ship mortgage by
reducing the number of liens, so as to facilitate credit for shipowners by
ensuring that the value of the security given would not be too seriously
undermined. 91 Ship mortgages did not provide the soundest security for
investment where vessels were in international trade; there was no guarantee
either that a mortgage could be enforced in a foreign port or, if the ship were
sold to satisfy another lien recognized by the foreign jurisdiction, that the
mortgage holder would be entitled to share in the proceeds.9 2 Recognizing
that a uniform system of foreign ship mortgage enforcement would administer
a commercial shot of adrenalin, the Comit6 made such a system one of its
main objectives; it also realized that the job would not be complete if interna-
tional accord were not reached on the number of liens taking preference over
the ship mortgage.
85. Id. at 210; ROBINsoN, ADImRALTY 435 (1939).
86. PRICE, op. cit. .rupra note 83, at 213.
87. The Secundus, 15 F.2d 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1927); The Olga, 32 Fed. 329, 330 (S.D.
N.Y. 1887) ; ROBINSON, ADrmiRAL-Y 435 (1939). But see The City of Athens, 83 F. Supp.
67, 78 (D. Md. 1949) ; The Oconee, 280 Fed. 927, 933 (E.D. Va. 1922).
88. PRICE, op. cit. supra note 83, at 214, 216.
89. Id. at 215, 216.
90. Id. at 216.
91. Id. at 218; Franck, The New Law for the Seas, 42 L.Q. Rm. 313 (1926).
92. At the time of the Comit6's formation, American law considered the ship mortgage
to be a non-maritime contract, unenforceable and unrecognized in admiralty. The J.E.
Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1 (1893) ; Bogart v. The John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399 (1854) ;
RoBiNsoN, ADMIRALTY 194-95 (1939). English statutes granted a registered domestic
mortgage recognition in admiralty, but made no provisions for a foreign ship mortgage.
See Lord & Glenn, The Foreign Ship Mortgage, 56 YALE L.J. 923, 932 (1947).
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But in striving for agreement among many nations as to the proper number
and priority of maritime liens, the principle of uniformity again came into
conflict with group interests. During a series of annual meetings prior to
World War I, efforts to limit the number of recognized liens were opposed
by countries where established liens would have been denied recognition. 3
Germany, for example, argued for the retention of its practice of granting a
lien on a vessel to every creditor whose claim could be subjected to a limita-
tion of liability proceeding.94 The American delegates were chiefly concerned
with the lien in favor of any person furnishing supplies, repairs, or other
necessaries to a vessel.9 They argued that although the United States was
not (at that time) a great shipowning nation, it was one to which ships
frequently came. Therefore, a convention which did not recognize a lien for
necessaries would find little favor here. Furthermore, American spokesmen
insisted that the interests of ship mortgagees did not justify the elimination
of a necessaries lien, which not only protected materialmen but also aided
small shipowners in obtaining credit for immediate needs. 0
A draft convention drawn up in 1913 represented the extent of the Comit6's
progress prior to World War I. 9 7 It contained an exclusive enumeration of claims
which would give rise to maritime liens. A lien for necessaries was included,
but only for those furnished outside the home port. s All claims secured by
liens took precedence over a ship mortgage;09 however, mortgages duly
effected and registered under the laws of any contracting state would be
recognized and enforced in all others. 10 0 War prevented any positive action
by the nations on the 1913 draft.
While Europe was still readjusting at the end of the war, the United States
approached the problem of the ship mortgage by means of domestic legislation.
The Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 101 gave the mortgage the status of a maritime
lien for the first time. The act created a "preferred ship mortgage" with a lien
taking precedence over all others except prior liens and "preferred liens" for
tort damages, wages, general average, and salvage, no matter when incurred.19-'
However, the Ship Mortgage Act applied only to American-held mortgages
93. The history of the Comit6' efforts to achieve international uniformity in the
fields of liens and mortgages is given in detail in PRicE, M.%uTrrnE Limxs 218-37 (1940).
94. Id. at 218, 223, 226.
95. Id. at 224.
96. Id. at 226.
97. The! 1913 draft (hereinafter cited as 1913 DRAFt) is printed in U. S. DEuxm.'zs
TO THE 1922 BRUSSELS CoNFEP.ECE, REPORT 47-51 (1923).
98. The complete list of claims giving rise to maritime liens was as follows: (1) law
costs, public taxes, and charges; (2) mages; (3) salvage and general average; (4)
necessaries furnished outside the home port; (5) tort damages. 1913 Dmr-.r art. 3.
99. See BarrisH DELEGATES TO THE 1922 BRUSSELS CONFEL EcE, REr nr 14 (1923).
100. 1913 Dru-,T art. 1.
101. 41 STAT. 1003, § 30(K) (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1952).
102. Ibid.
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on American vessels; foreign mortgagees and American mortgagees of foreign
vessels were still unprovided for.
10 3
The Ship Mortgage Act also reenacted the Federal Maritime Lien Act of
1910,104 which had dealt with the status of a lien for necessaries. Prior to
1910, the general maritime law granted a maritime lien only for such neces-
saries as were furnished in a foreign port. Materialmen furnishing supplies
in the home port were left to their remedies under local law. 10 Such confusion
had been engendered by this distinction that the Act of 1910 abolished it, pro-
viding instead that a supplier of necessaries would obtain a lien enforceable
in rem, whether the vessel were foreign or domestic.100 Under the Ship Mortgage
Act, this necessaries lien was inferior to the mortgage lien unless incurred
prior to it.
107
When the delegations to the Comit6 reconvened in Brussels in 1922, the
United States flatly declared that the 1913 draft's abolition of certain liens,
especially that for necessaries furnished in a home port, rendered it tnaccept-
able.' 08 In an effort to secure American support, the conference rewrote the
103. Lord & Glenn, The Foreign Ship Mortgage, 56 Y.ME L.J. 923, 937 (1947).
The requirements that both the mortgaged vessel and the mortgagee be American are
found in subsection D of the Act of 1920:
"(a) : A valid mortgage which at the time it is made, includes the whole of any
vessel of the United States ... shall, in addition have, in respect to such vessel and
as of the date of the compliance with all the provisions of this subdivision, the
preferred status given by the provisions of subsection M, if-
(5) The mortgagee is a citizen of the United States ....
"(b) : Any mortgage which complies in respect to any vessel with the conditions
enumerated in this subsection is hereafter in this section called a 'preferred
mortgage' as to such vessel."
41 STAT. 1000, § 30(D) (1920); 46 U.S.C. § 922 (1952).
In addition, it is unlawful to transfer or mortgage any American-documented vessel
to any person not a citizen of the United States, without the permission of the Govermnent,
52 STAT. 964 (1938) ; 46 U.S.C. § 808 (1952).
Though the Ship Mortgage Act did not make admiralty process available for the
enforcement of a foreign ship mortgage, it was possible for a mortgagee who wished
to foreclose in America to bring a civil action, in the nature of what was formerly a bill
in equity, in a district court under what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1952). However, such pro-
ceedings were cumbersome; and, since an established ground of federal jurisdiction had
to be demonstrated, private mortgagees had serious difficulties. See S. Rm'. No, 1213,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954).
104. 36 STAT. 604 (1910), now merged in 41 STAT. 1005 (1920) ; 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-75
(1952).
105. The various states of the union were regarded as "foreign" to each other. The
domestic state could create a lien for necessaries if it wished. The lien was then con-
sidered "maritime," and could be enforced only in a federal court. RolimsoN, A),MIRALTVY
371 (1939).
106. For a discussion, see id. at 374.
107. See text at note 102 supra and note 110 infra.
108. See BRITISH DELEGATES, op. cit. supra note 99, at 14.
Ratification of the 1913 draft would have reintroduced into American law the distinc-
tion between necessaries furnished in a foreign port and those furnished in the home port.
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1913 draft along the lines of existing American legislation3 °  The liens ranking
prior to the ship mortgage were in general the same as the preferred liens
recognized by the Ship Mortgage Act.u ° It was further provided that every
nation was free to establish its own system of non-preferred liens which would
rank above a ship mortgage if incurred prior to the registration of the
mortgage, thus insuring the survival of American lien law.111 This 1922 draft,
the culmination of the Comitd's efforts, has been regarded as a healthy compro-
mise between international uniformity and group interests. Ship mortgages
duly recorded in one member country were to be enforced by libels in rem
in all'others, and the limited number of liens taking precedence over the
mortgage could not be created at the will of the owner and were easily
insurable against by the mortgagee. As for the necessaries lien, although it
ranked below a prior duly recorded mortgage, its efficacy was not seriously
diminished, whereas placing it above the mortgage lien would have drastically
undermined the latter's security value.
112
The 1922 draft was accepted by several states, but most of the world
awaited a lead from Great Britain and the United States. Yet, at the Genoa
Conference of the Comit6 in 1925, these powers dealt a death blow to the
convention goal of uniformity. The British representatives reported that
109. The American delegates to the 1922 conference had called the attention of the
other nations to the Ship Mortgage Act; and the act was seized upon as the foundation
for a compromise which, it was hoped, would secure American approval for the cun-
vention:
"As the result of this information it appeared to the conference that whilst it was
impossible at the present stage to obtain agreement with respect to all the claims
which should give rise to a lien on a vessel, there might not be the sa*me difficulty
in reaching an agreement as to the liens which should take precedence of a duly
effected mortgage; and the draft convention in its present form, as ultimately
agreed by all the delegates present, is an embodiment of this idea."
BnrrsH DELwATES, op. cit. supra note 99, at 15.
110. The Ship Mortgage Act ranked all prior liens, and liens for tort damages,
wages, general average, and salvage, above the mortgage. See text at note 105 supra.
The 1922 draft ranked liens for law costs, harbor dues and other public charges, w%,ages,
salvage, general average, and tort damages above the mortgage. 1922 DRArr arts. 1-3.
See BRITIsH DELEGATES, op. cit. supra note 99, at 56-58.
111. 1922 DRAr art. 3. The 1922 draft established a lien for necessaries furnished
away from the home port, but provided that it would rank below the mortgage unless
incurred prior to it. 1922 DaFr arts. 2, 3. American insistence upon a lien for necessaries
in the home port could be satisfied by exercising the option granted by article 3:
"Every nation is left free to establish such system of nonpreferred maritime liens
as it may deem proper. Maritime liens, whether of the preferred or nunpreferred
class, in existence prior to the recording of the mortgage, take precedence over
the mortgage if entered in a public register, either at the purt of the vessel's
registry or at a central office in the country to which the vessel belongs, within a
period of three months after the lien arose'
U.S. DELEGATES TO THE 1922 BRussMs CoN.aZxcR, REmT 5 (1923).
112. PRICE, MARiTE LiExs 230 (1940); Franck, The New Law for the Seas, 42
L.Q. REv. 303, 313 (1926).
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businessmen in England demanded a more effective lien for necessaries. 118
And, although the American delegation had favorably reported to the Presi-
dent on the 1922 draft, 114 the United States informed the Comit6 that this
country would never accept the convention. There were still too many differ-
ences between the system it contemplated and established American law.ltS
Furthermore, uncertainties existed as to the constitutionality of such a
treaty."" These stemmed from similar misgivings about the validity of the
Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. Because the Supreme Court had in an early
case held the ship mortgage to be non-maritime, 117 some felt the act might be
construed as an invalid effort to extend admiralty jurisdiction. 118 If thig were
so, it was thought that a treaty purporting to achieve the same results must
also fall. 119
Certain changes were made by the Comit6 in its final draft of 1926 ;120 but
the treaty was never again urged seriously in the United States, and, though
113. "The British delegation reported that objections had been raised in England
by business men who were not interested in questions of theory and had no knowledge of
the work of the International Maritime Committee. The delegation emphasized the import-
ance of the lien in favor of the necessaries men since it was by their means that the
vessel was enabled to continue her voyage." PRICE, op. cit. supra note 112, at 232.
114. "The importance of securing international recognition of ship mortgages iss
obvious. Without such recognition the value of ship securities is greatly impaired. While
the ship mortgage convention cannot be regarded as a complete and perfect document,
we believe that supplemented by such national legislation as is permissible thereunder,
it should commend itself to those interested in maritime affairs." U.S. DELEGATES, Op. Cit,
mipra note 111, at 6.
115. PaIcE, op. cit. supra note 112, at 231-32.
116. Ibid.
117. Bogart v. The John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399 (1854). See note 92 supra.
118. The Constitution granted the federal courts exclusive competence over all cases
of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In Bogart v. The
John Jay, the Supreme Court characterized the ship mortgage as a non-maritime contract.
This classification would render any subsequent effort to bring mortgages within the
cognizance of admiralty courts unconstitutional, "for if the transaction were not maritime,
it was not among the matters apportioned to the federal government's keeping." RoINSON,
ADmIRALTY 194 (1939). But The John Jay also contained language indicating that the
mortgage involved was not enforceable in admiralty because the court lacked facilities
to give it "remedies and protection." This might have been only because Congress had
not yet acted; and its action, in the ultimate form of the Ship Mortgage Act, would not
then be invalid. ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 195 (1939).
The question was resolved in favor of the act by the decision of the Supreme Court
in The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
119. But this would not necessarily follow. "The suggestion is sometimes made that
some legislative action, not directly within the constitutional power of Congress, might
be brought within that power by negotiating a treaty requiring the enactment of the
desired law, and then justifying the statute as implementing the treaty." 4 BENEDICT,
ADMIRALTY 278 (6th ed. 1940). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (act
of Congress regulating killing of migratory birds held valid as effectuating treaty with
Great Britain, although a similar act, passed before the treaty, had been held uncon-
stitutional).
120. The lien for necessaries furnished in a foreign port was given priority over
the mortgage even if incurred subsequently, but it was to be enforceable only for six
(Vol. 64: 878
UNIFORM MARITIME LAW
ratification was advocated in Great Britain, it never came about.12 ' A flicker
of hope was raised when the Supreme Court, in The Thomas Barian, 12n
held the Ship Mortgage Act constitutional. The theory Awas that if Great
Britain would accept the Convention, the United States was then free to
follow.'2 3 However, this hope proved idle; and so the Comit6's envisioned
uniformity for maritime liens and mortgages failed of achievement.
Recent attention has focused upon the unsatisfactory status of the law re-
garding enforcement of foreign ship mortgages. The Bogart case had held
a ship mortgage non-maritime, and thus unenforceable in admiralty courts. 2 4
Yet only in admiralty can a foreclosure sale be effected which will give good
title against the world. 1 2 5 The Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 opened American
admiralty courts for the enforcement of a domestic mortgage; but no statute
or decision extended such benefits to the holder of a foreign ship mortgage.'-
Similarly, in England registered domestic ship mortgages were made enforce-
able in admiralty by statute, and were given a relatively favorable priority posi-
tion, but the situation with regard to foreign ship mortgages has remained less de-
sirable.' 2 7 It has been argued that a 1922 English decision, The Colorado,1  had
the effect of rendering foreign mortgages enforceable in English admiralty courts,
thereby accomplishing by case law what had not been done by statute.Y- 3 How-
months thereafter. Other liens had a life span of one year. PRiCE, op. cit. sipra note
112, at 233.
121. Id. at 237.
122. 293 U.S. 21 (1934). See RoBINsON, AwMaiRArv, 195 (1939).
123. "Opposition also exists in the United States, but has perhaps been lessened by the
decision in the Barium case, where the Supreme Court held that the Ship Mortgage Act.
1920, was constitutional, thus enlarging the legislative powers of Congress with respect
to the jurisdiction in Admiralty. It may, indeed, turn out that the Barium decision will
so weaken the American opposition to the Convention on constitutional grounds that the
United States might be inclined to follow if Great Britain should adopt the Conventiun.
The objections must rest hereafter on business grounds only. American business men,
however, appear to be well content with the present situation." PRIcE, 11ARvaTin Lir_:,S
236-37 (1940).
124. See notes 92 and 117 supra.
125. See S. REP. No. 1213, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954); text at note 82 supra.
126. See text at note 103 supra.
127. See note 92 supra.
128. [1923] P. 102 (C.A.).
129. The Colorado, a French vessel, was seized in England by English repairmen
on a statutory lien which ranked below the lien for a domestic registered mirtgage,
but above a claim based on an unregistered mortgage. Belgian mortgagees under a "hypo-
th~que" registered in France were held by the British court to take before the repairmten,
for the French hypoth~que was analogous to the English registered mortgage, and thu,
entitled to the priority that English law would accord the latter. The Colorado, [19231
P. 102, 107 (C.A.).
"The Colorado case thus established that if a foreign mortgag, was endowed by
foreign law with the attributes of a maritime lien or of an English mortgage, it would
be accredited the same preferential rights specifically granted by English statutes to
English mortgages, even though such statutes did not in terms extend to foreign
mortgages." Lord & Glenn, The Foreign Ship M[ortgage, 56 YALE W. 923, 934 (1947).
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ever, it is the opinion of the Comit6 that the enforceability of foreign ship
mortgages in that country remains uncertain and unsatisfactory.180
The American law concerning enforcement of foreign ship mortgages was
recently improved. The federal government, which retained mortgages on a
considerable number of vessels sold to foreign nations after World War II,131
was inconvenienced by the lack of an available action in admiralty when it
became necessary to foreclose such mortgages.132 Largely for this reason,
branches of the executive looked with favor upon a proposed amendment
to the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 brought forward by the Maritime Law
Association of the United States. This amendment became law in July 1954,133
and it has the effect of giving a foreign ship mortgage, for the first time in this
country, the status of a maritime lien. Under the new law, the term "preferred
mortgage," previously confined to domestic ship mortgages, is expanded to
include "any mortgage, hypothecation, or similar charge created as security
upon any documented foreign vessel," if such security interest has been duly
registered according to the laws of the foreign flag. And such a foreign
mortgage shall be granted a "preferred mortgage lien" similar to that enjoyed
130. The 1951 Naples Conference of the Comit6 demonstrated the continuing dissatis-
faction of that body with the state of the law in England. "The Conference passed a
resolution repeating its recommendation that those countries that do not now afford
an adequate remedy by which foreign mortgages may be foreclosed (namely England and
the British Commonwealths and Possessions) should amend their laws to give such
remedy." U.S. MARITIME LAW ASs'N, REPORT ON NAPLES COIrF.REIcE 3502 (Doe. No.
351, 1951).
131. "Through sales of vessels to foreign buyers under the Merchant Ship Sales Act
of 1946, the United States represented by the Maritime Administration holds mortgages
which secure balances of the purchase price of such war-built vessels aggregating about
$125 million." H.R. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954).
132. Maritime Administration mortgages could be enforced in the district courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1952) ; see note 106 supra. The requirement that federal jurisdic-
tion be demonstrated was met by resort to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1952), because the suit
was by the United States. But Government lawyers were dissatisfied with these cumber-
some proceedings. See S. REP. No. 1213, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954).
133. The amendment reads:
"Foreign ship mortgages: As used in sections 951-954 of this title, the term
"preferred mortgage" shall include, in addition to a preferred mortgage made
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, any mortgage, hypothecation, or similar
charge created as security upon any documented foreign vessel (other than a tow
boat, barge, scow, lighter, car float, canal boat, or tank vessel, of less than two
hundred gross tons) if such mortgage, hypothecation, or similar charge has been
duly and validly executed in accordance with the laws of the foreign nation under
the laws of which the vessel is documented and has been duly registered in
accordance with such laws in a public register either at the port of registry of the
vessel or at a central office; and the term "preferred mortgage lien" shall also
include the lien of such mortgage, hypothecation, or similar charge; Provided,
however, That such preferred mortgage lien in the case of a foreign vessel shall
also be subordinate to maritime liens for repairs, supplies, towage, use of drydock
or marine railway, or other necessaries performed or supplied in the United States."
68 STAT. 323 (1954), 46 U.S.C.A. § 951 (Supp. 1954).
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by a domestic mortgage. There is, however, one important difference: in the
case of a foreign vessel, the "preferred mortgage lien" shall be subordinate
to maritime liens for repairs, supplies, towage, or other necessaries performed
or supplied in the United States, as well as to liens having priority over
domestic ship mortgages.
The inclusion of this last provision was occasioned by factors which recall
the unhappy fate of the 1926 convention in this country. Originally, the
Maritime Law Association's proposed amendment contained no such clause.
However, in 1951, to meet the objections of ship repairmen and possibly other
domestic lienors, it was included, but with no requirement that necessaries
be furnished in the United States.134 When representatives of the Association
were in Washington soliciting support for the amendment, the Maritime Ad-
ministration insisted that the proviso preferring repairs and necessaries to the
foreign mortgage lien be restricted to those supplied in this country.13 5 The
members of the Association, accustomed to long contact with other nations
through the Comit6, and perhaps more sensitive to the foreign point of view,
objected that such a restricted proviso would be unfavorably regarded on the
other side of the Atlantic. Such a reaction, they argued, would be particularly
unfortunate in the light of the Association's hopes that Great Britain would
respond to the new law by passing a similar statute, granting non-British
mortgages recognition in British admiralty courts.3 6 But the refusal of the
Secretary of Commerce to recommend the bill unless only domestic repairmen
were favored proved decisive.'
37
There is some uncertainty as to the intended scope of the new Amnerican
amendment. The language of the statute provides for the inclusion in the term
"preferred mortgage" of "any mortgage . . . created as a security upon any
foreign vessel."'x3 This would appear to extend admiralty process in our
courts to any mortgagee of a foreign vessel, whether or not the mortgagee is an
American citizen. Yet it has been argued that American citizenship on the
134. The clause read: "Provided how',evr, that such 'preferred mortgage lien' in the
case of a foreign vessel shall also be subordinate to maritime liens for repairs, supplies,
towage, use of drydock or marine railway, or other necessaries." U.S. MImRITn LAw
Ass'x, PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL MEETING 3477 (Doc. No. 346, 1951).
135. See U.S. MA'_RiTE LAW Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL Ma.EMi.G 3562 (Dmc.
No. 359, 1952). The Maritime Administration proposed adding the words "performed or
supplied in the United States" to the provision. The reason given for restricting the favored
necessaries lien to those furnished in this country was that otherwise American mortgagees
of foreign vessels might lose their advantage with respect to foreign liens in cases where
the law of the flag would have subordinated the liens to the mortgage.
136. Ibid.
137. See U.S. MA.urlm, LAw Ass'-, PROCEaINGS tiF ANNUAL MEETING 3797 (DOC.
No. 382, 1954). The Secretary of Commerce felt that "there appears to be no reason
to include within the operation of the proviso liens arising from repairs and supplies
furnished outside the United States, and thereby give a foreign repairman a priority
which even under the laws of his own country might not he accorded him." S. REP. Xo.
1213, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954).
138. See note 133 supra.
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part of the mortgagee is a prerequisite to the benefits of the amendment.'
Proponents of this thesis point out that the stated primary intent of Congress
in passing the new law was to afford American mortgagees, notably the Govern-
ment, with adequate relief.' 40 Moreover, confining the effect of the amendment
to American-held mortgages would be more consistent with the original statute,
the Ship Mortgage Act, which was limited by its terms to domestic mortgagees
and domestic vessels.' 41 Against this background, it is said, if Congress bad
really meant to benefit foreign mortgagees by this addition, it would have
more clearly expressed its intention. Therefore, until Congress does so, a
broader interpretation of the statute should be rejected, especially since it
might flood American courts with foreign litigation.
14 2
But other considerations militate against narrow construction of the 1954
amendment. The statutory language appears unambiguous, and the legislative
history contains no indication of a desire to exclude foreign mortgagees. While
it is true that Congress' primary intent was to benefit American investors,143
this should not of itself limit the effect of the amendment. American limita-
tion of liability statutes were passed with the avowed purpose of stimulating
domestic shipowners ;144 yet foreigners have long been held entitled to their
protection in American courts.' 45  In addition, the amendment specifically
restricts the sections of the Ship Mortgage Act which apply to the foreign
ship mortgage to those referring to mortgage enforcement.140 This would seem
to render the citizenship requirements for the domestic mortgage, contained in
earlier sections, irrelevant in the case of a foreign vessel and its mortgagee.
147
139. This argument has been made by the libellant in a recent case now awaiting
decision by the United States District Court for the Balboa Division of the Canal Zone.
The Aruba, Admiralty No. 3996. The litigation involves the proceeds of a foreclosure
sale of a foreign vessel, with a foreign mortgagee as intervenor.
140. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
141. See text at note 103 supra.
142. The danger of foreign litigants besieging American courts would be keen in
any port where international traffic is heavy. The Canal Zone presents a striking example.
143. "But the Ship Mortgage Act at present offers no remedy to American holders
of mortgages on foreign-flag vessels. This bill is designed to correct the situation by
extending the term "preferred mortgage" as used in the Ship Mortgage Act to mortgages
on foreign vessels when duly executed and registered in accordance with the laws of the
foreign nation under which the vessel is documented." H.R. REP. No. 1662, qd Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1954). See text at note 132 supra.
144. See Hartford Acc. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 214 (1927); RoD11SoN,
ADmiRALTY 878 (1939).
145. See The Titanic, 233 U.S. 718, 731 (1914) ; RoBiNsoN, ADMIRALTY 902 (1939).
146. See the amendment quoted note 133 supra. Sections 952-54 deal with the receiver
in foreclosure, the priorities of the liens, and the ability of a mortgagee to sue in admiralty
in the event of a default. 41 STAr. 1003 §§ K, L, M, N (1920); 46 U.S.C. §§ 951-54
(1952).
147. "Our amendment to the 1920 act specifies the sections of the act which are made
applicable to a foreign ship mortgage and thus avoids any involvment with the require-
ment of an affidavit of citizenship." Letter from John C. Prizer, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Enforcement of Foreign Ship Mortgages of the Maritime Law Association, to
the Yale Law Journal March 10, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library.
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The 1954 amendment should be held applicable to foreign mortgagees as
well as domestic ones. The amendment was fostered by the Maritime Law
Association, the American branch of the Comit6;148 and in the absence of a
clear congressional mandate to the contrary, it should be construed so as to
further the principle of international uniformity towards which the Comit6
has directed its efforts. The status of the foreign ship mortgage would remain
unresolved if the courts should hold that only domestic mortgagees were
protected by the new statute. In contrast, if the 1954 amendment is inter-
preted to mepn what it says, it may be hoped and expected that Great Britain
will soon enact legislation granting similar relief to holders of foreign ship
mortgages.1
49
It would appear, then, that by a combination of Anglo-American legislation
and European adherence to the 1926 Convention, the status of the foreign
ship mortgage may be resolved in relatively satisfactory fashion. But inter-
national uniformity on the related problem of maritime liens is a dream
now long faded.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
The history of these hvo Brussels Conventions reveals the essential conflict
betveen the fundamental principle of international uniformity and various
private interests. It is evident that uniformity cannot be achieved in any
significant part of the maritime law without concessions from certain quarters.
What must be determined in each instance is whether or not international
harmony is of sufficient commercial and legal importance to justify the
concessions.
Collision Liablity
American adherence to the Collisions Convention would be a desirable de-
velopment. Every other important maritime nation subscribes to the modern
equitable principle of proportional fault; in clinging to a rigid rule of equal
damages even where unequal degrees of blame exist, this country stubbornly
turns its back on progress. Furthermore, the unique position of the United
States regarding collision liability, resulting from failure to ratify the treaty
and invalidation of the both-to-blame clause, has awkward consequences in
litigation. With the two judicial systems offering advantages to different
148. See text at note 132 supra.
149. See U.S. M_%UmT= Law Ass'x, PRoCEmINs oF AzixUAL NMFrm:c 34,4
(Doc. No. 346, 1951).
The Comit6 itself had considered drafting a convention which would apply only to the
enforcement of foreign ship mortgages, isolating the troublesome question of lien priorities.
In 1951, the Maritime Law Association of the United States passed a resulutitn in favor
of proposing such a convention at the next meeting of the ComitY. Ibid. But, since thi
country proceeded by means of domestic legislation, the international organization contented
itself with expressions of impatience and encouragement, directed at those nations which
had not adhered to the 1926 convention. See U.S. MA..RiTimE LAw Ass'., REra. o:
NAPL.Es CoxFRF'cE 3505 (Doc. No. 351, 1951).
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parties, forum-shopping, multiplicity of suits, and obstacles to amicable settle-
ments inevitably follow.
No national policy militates against ratification of the Collisions Convention.
If anything, congressional legislation in the field is consistent with the results
which would be attained by the convention, at least insofar as the immunity of
a carrier from liability to its cargo is concerned. 150 This was expressly recog-
nized by the Senate subcommittee which considered the convention. 151
But the degree of opposition to the convention on the part of American cargo
interests is a reflection of their considerable economic stake in preserving the
status quo. The rights of cargo are substantial and established, and are entitled
to careful consideration before being altered.
A possible compromise solution is presented in a proposal made by the
British delegation to the Brighton conference of the Comit6 Maritime Inter-
national in September 1954. It involves a suggested increase in the funds
which English law provides for limitation of liability proceedings. At present,
the funds made available in Great Britain are £8 per ton for property damage
and £15 per ton if loss of life or personal injury is involved. 1 2 These limits
were fixed by an 1862 statute based upon the then average value per ton of
the British mercantile marine. 15 3 The British Maritime Law Association be-
lieves that, in view of subsequent world inflation, the principle of limitation
of shipowners' liability may fall into community disfavor if the limits are not
increased to provide a more realistic recovery. 54 To this end, it was proposed
at Brighton that for property damage the fund would consist of £24 per ton,
and for death or injury claims £50 per ton. If this latter fund should not
satisfy all claims upon it, death and injury claimants would share pari passu
with the property claimants in the fund established by the £24 per ton. The
British Association suggested that this scheme be embodied in a new interna-
tional convention, which would replace the relatively unsuccessful Brussels
Limitation Convention of 1924.15
150. No congressional policy is on record concerning the other major alteration of
American law that ratification of the convention would bring about: replacement of the
equal division of damages rule by that of proportional liability. See note 22 supra.
151. See note 64 supra.
152. See text at note 40 supra.
153. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1862, 57 & 58 VicT., c. 60.
154. See proposals of British Maritime Law Ass'n on Limitation of Shipowners' Lia-
bility, July 22, 1954, at 2, 3 (on file in Yale Law Library). The British Association
stated:
"British shipowners regard this matter as one of great importance and indeed
urgency. Having regard to the recent heavy increase in the sums awarded by the
Tribunals in all countries to loss of life and personal injury claimants and to the
steady increase in commodity values, they consider that it would be unwise as
well as inequitable to attempt to hold to the existing limits under English law."
Ibid.
155. Preferring international treatment of the problem to domestic legislation, the
British Association distributed drafts of a proposed convention built around the new
limitations to all members of the Comite on December 10, 1954. (Draft on file in Yale
Law Library.)
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Acquiescence in revision of American law on limitation of liability along
the lines of the recent British proposal would represent a considerable con-
cession on the part of shipowners. Whereas now if the vessel is totally lost
property damage goes unrecompensed and death and injury claims are limited
to a sixty dollars per ton fund,156 this new proposal would tend to increase
materially the shipowner's liability to both types of claimants.
The American delegates promised to report the proposal of the British
group to the Maritime Law Association of the United States upon their return
and discussions may ensue in the near future. In view of the close connection
between the limitation system and collision liability, reformation of the former
might lead to changes in the latter. If the shipping industry in this country
can be persuaded to favor the British proposal regarding limitation of liability,
then cargo interests, having received a considerable concession, may reasonably
be expected to withdraw their objections to the Collisions Convention. Indeed,
just such a compromise was tentatively suggested by the spokesman for cargo
at the Senate hearings in 1938.157
American shipowning interests should carefully weigh the merits of the
British proposal on limitations. If approved, it could be made the lever by
which the United States is moved into line with the rest of the world on
the important question of collision liability.
Maritine Liens and Mortgages
The indifferent success of the Liens and Mortgages Convention indicates
that the principle of international uniformity cannot apply to some facets of
the maritime law. American insistence on a lien for necessaries was only
typical of the various pressures asserted by groups in other nations. Maritime
liens appear to be too influenced by national characteristics to lend themselve.,
to regulation by an international convention. Their creation and priorities
will in all likelihood remain a matter of national law.
Enforcement of a foreign ship mortgage, however, presents no great difficulty.
Solely the interests of the immediate parties are at stake in a simple foreclosure
suit. The troublesome priority question, which has obstructed international
uniformity, arises only when the mortgage lien is competing with other liens.
It is unfortunate that mortgage enforcement provisions were included in the
doomed Liens Convention; in attempting to accomplish too much, the
Comit6 accomplished less than was possible. The recent statutory amend-
ment regarding foreign mortgages in the United States suggests that those
nations which balked at the lien provisions of the convention might have been
willing to handle mortgages separately. It is hoped that progress in this
particular field will be continued through legislation in Great Britain and in other
nations not now adequately providing for the enforcement of foreign ship
mortgages. This would greatly enhance the security value of the mortgage,
and thus provide another example of the benefits to be derived from uniformity
in the maritime law.
156. See text at notes 38-39 supra.
157. See text at notes 43-44 supra.
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